America is Not Leaving Europe — But the Rules Have Changed
by Piotr Wilczek Warsaw Freedom Institute warsawfi.org
America remains committed to Europe, but the rules of transatlantic cooperation are changing. For Poland, this creates both new opportunities and new responsibilities.
The first 18 months of President Trump’s second term have brought real turbulence. Sharp rhetoric about NATO as a “paper tiger,” warnings directed at free-riders, dramatic statements on Greenland, the swift and largely unilateral operation against Iran in the spring, and questions — sometimes abrupt — about the scale and permanence of the U.S. military presence in Europe have all created uncertainty. Here in Poland, adjustments in deployment schedules, followed by the recent decision to send additional troops, have left many wondering about Washington’s long-term commitment to our security and to NATO’s eastern flank. It is therefore unsurprising that recent surveys show some erosion in the percentage of Poles who describe the United States as a fully reliable ally, with similar trends visible across much of Europe.
These concerns are legitimate and deserve honest discussion. Yet if we look beyond the headlines and the rhetoric, a deeper and more structural picture emerges.
The United States is not withdrawing from Europe or from Poland. It is changing the terms on which it engages with the world. The National Security Strategy of December 2025 and the practical tests we have already seen — from Venezuela in January to the Persian Gulf this spring — reveal a consistent new logic. American power is being exercised more selectively, more transactionally, and more explicitly in the service of narrowly defined national interests: above all, systemic competition with China, primacy in the Western Hemisphere, and the protection of the American homeland. Alliances, including NATO, are treated as instruments whose value is measured by the concrete security they deliver and the costs they impose on the United States. Multilateral legitimacy and shared values have become secondary considerations.
In this emerging order, Poland occupies a distinctly advantageous position — stronger, in many respects, than it occupied four years ago.
Our defense spending, sustained at levels approaching five percent of GDP — the highest in the Alliance — our record purchases of American equipment, our unwavering support for Ukraine, and our clear policy of restricting Chinese access to critical infrastructure and military facilities have not gone unnoticed in Washington. U.S. Ambassador Tom Rose has publicly called Poland “Europe’s new great power” and the “ideal ally.” In Washington’s defense and strategic-policy circles, Poland is increasingly viewed as one of America’s principal military partners on the continent, and in some respects a more reliable security actor than several traditional Western European allies.
This assessment is reflected in concrete reality: the continued presence of V Corps headquarters in Poznań, the rapid development of logistics hubs such as Powidz, the modernization of training areas in Drawsko and Orzysz, and the recent announcement of additional U.S. forces. Poland’s formal request for a new permanent American base further confirms that Warsaw sees tangible strategic value in deepening the American military presence — and that Washington recognizes Poland’s growing importance. At the same time, we must remain clear-eyed. The era of largely automatic guarantees is giving way to a logic of demonstrated reciprocity. Article 5 remains in force, but its practical application is becoming more conditional. Washington expects Europe — and especially NATO’s eastern flank — to carry the primary burden of deterring Russia, while the United States concentrates resources on the Indo-Pacific and on homeland priorities. The comparison between the management of the Ukraine crisis in 2022 and the Iran operation this year illustrates the shift with brutal clarity.
For Poland this creates both opportunity and risk.
The opportunity is real. Because we are already doing many of the things the new American strategy demands — maintaining high defense spending, making major equipment purchases, supporting Ukraine, and taking a tough line on China — we are positioned as a net contributor rather than a consumer of security. This opens doors to deeper cooperation in technology, friend-shoring of supply chains, energy, and advanced manufacturing. It also gives Poland greater voice in Washington on issues that matter to us. The risk is equally real. Internal polarization in the United States, especially ahead of the November congressional elections, introduces volatility. Any perception on the American side that Poland is becoming just another European country that speaks about security but delivers less would quickly erode the premium we currently enjoy. The same applies, symmetrically, to any loss of coherence or determination on our own side.
What should Poland do in this environment?
First, we must treat the relationship with the United States as the central, fundamental pillar of our security policy — within NATO, but with a clear understanding of Poland’s specific place in European structures at a time of growing transatlantic divergence. Second, we need a standing, high-level inter-agency coordination mechanism for policy toward Washington, ensuring consistency across all parts of the state.
Third, we should launch a sustained, cross-partisan effort to present Poland’s contributions and strategic importance directly to the U.S. Congress — especially the armed services and foreign relations committees — and to the broader American expert community.
The Polish American alliance is not sliding from friendship into distrust. It is evolving from a relationship based on shared values and a high degree of automatic solidarity into one based on shared interests, demonstrated capabilities, and mutual accountability. This evolution carries risks, but it also carries the potential for a more resilient and more equal partnership — precisely because Poland has shown, and continues to show, that it is willing to accept the responsibilities and bear the costs that the new American strategy requires.
The task before us is to manage this transition with strategic clarity, political discipline, and confidence in our own agency.
The Warsaw Freedom Institute is a Washington, D.C.-based organization dedicated to strengthening cooperation between Poland and the United States. As a sister organization of the Freedom Institute in Warsaw, it serves as a platform for dialogue, cooperation, and leadership development.
By connecting business leaders, experts and policymakers, the Institute promotes understanding of Northeastern Europe’s strategic role and supports a strong transatlantic partnership.
